Overview of Two-Nation Theory and Independence
Those who argue that Hindus and Muslims are two irreconcilable nations simply based on the fact that India had to deal with Islamic invaders must also quantify how many of the sub-continent’s Muslims identified, or collaborated with such barbaric excesses of conquest. Did ordinary Muslims see Islamic invaders as their champions or liberators, as some argue? Could one conclude that Islam came to the sub-continent solely as a conquering force, and that all Muslims were in some way responsible for the acts of violent desecration that took place? If this were true, how is it that a majority of these Islamic invaders had to fight local Islamic rulers to gain control of India? And how is it that ordinary Muslims were as much victims of pillage and plunder as were Hindus?
Religious Commonality and Nationhood:
First, let us examine the proposition that religious commonality is the primary motive force behind modern nationhood. If religious commonality were the essential engine for nation-building, it is odd that Europe’s Christian followers are divided into so many different nations. Even if we accept that it was denominational differences that divided them, we might still ask – why aren’t all the followers of the Roman Catholic faith in Europe nationally unified? Why aren’t they united in Central and South America? Why didn’t all Protestants get together in one nation?
If religion alone could serve as the basis for national unity – how is it that in spite of several attempts at unity, Islam failed to unify the Arabic-speaking people of North Africa and the Middle East?
If Islam could not be developed as the primary basis of national identity in the Arab world where Islam originated and had virtually universal following – isn’t it peculiar that Islam should be viewed as the pre-eminent basis for defining national identity in the sub-continent?
If we were to go by the experiences of the European or other Asian nations, we would find that cultural and linguistic factors, and shared historical experiences have often been more decisive in forging the idea of nationhood.
The claim that the sub-continent comprises two nations – Hindus and Muslims, is a stark exception to the general pattern of nation-building elsewhere in the world. Yet, many Western intellectuals have promoted this claim as if it were within the ambit of a generally accepted or universally valid model.
If these analysts could prove that the secular life of the Indian people were entirely subsumed by religious affiliation, or prove that religion played a substantially greater role in the life of the Indian people than anywhere else, that alone would not be sufficient to prove their two-nation claim. In theory, two people could be devoutly religious, practice different religions, but remain completely tolerant and respectful of each other’s religions and wish to stay together in one nation.
To prove their claim, these intellectuals would also have to demonstrate that of all contradictions between the people – the religious contradiction was most germane. That not only did religion divide the Indian people in a manner that could not be easily reconciled, that it also bound people in a way that nothing else did. They would have to show that socio-economic relations, cultural activities and political actions were propelled by specific allegiance to either Hinduism or Islam. That cultural, linguistic, economic and political antagonisms within Hinduism and Islam were minimal, but conflicts between practitioners of the two distinct faiths were of such magnitude that no democratic framework could possibly resolve them. As evidence of “irreconcilable difference” they would need to show that there were none or few (and exceptional) instances of peaceful co-existence or mutual tolerance between the two communities.
These were some important and essential differences between India’s Islamic rulers and the British Colonists. To the extent that India’s Islamic rulers planned to make India their home, and spend their acquired wealth in India – wisdom eventually propelled a majority of them towards secular practice – towards fostering peaceful co-existence between Hindus and Muslims. But the beneficiaries of British rule had no intentions of spending the Indian surplus in India. The tenure of individual administrators was temporary, and the capital extracted from India was primarily for use in Britain, or elsewhere in Europe and America. A secular policy was neither essential to their survival, nor helpful to their goal of using India’s wealth to enrich Britain. In fact, 1857 had shown how dangerous the unity of the Indian masses could be to their political authority.
The Muslim League:
Maulana Azad (President of the Indian National Congress during colonial rule) writing in “India Wins Freedom” describes the emergence of the Muslim League in these words:
“It was said that one of the objects of the League would be to strengthen and develop a feeling of loyalty to the British Govt. amongst the Muslims of India. The second object was to advance the claims of the Muslims against Hindus and other communities in respect of service under the crown and thus safeguard Muslim interests and rights. The leaders of the League were therefore naturally opposed to the demand for political independence raised by the Congress. They felt that if the Muslims joined in any such demand the British would not support their claims for special treatment in education and service. In fact, they described the Congress as a disloyal organization of rebels and regarded even moderate leaders like Gokhale and Ferozeshah Mehta as extremists. During this phase the British Govt. always used the Muslim League as a counter to the demands of the Congress.”
“The Muslim League entered into the second phase of its activites when it found that the Government was compelled to introduce some reforms as a result of Congress pressure. It was somewhat disturbed when it saw the Congress achieving it’s objective step by step. The League still remained aloof from the political struggle but as soon as any advance was made, it put in a claim on behalf of the Muslim community. This program of the Muslim League suited the (colonial) govt. well. In fact, there are reasons to think that the League was acting according to the wishes of the British.”
Around this time, the British did something else to hamper the unity of the Indian people. They had already introduced job quotas based on religious affiliations. Now they introduced voting for local bodies based on a divided electorate. There were separate Hindu seats and Muslim seats. And voting was first restricted to property holders and later to those who were literate. Since literacy was very low – just 8% after the first world war and 11% in 1947 – a very small percentage of people could vote. But even those that had the vote were divided along religious lines.
In spite of all this rigging, the Muslim League initially won little support even amongst the Muslim elites of the sub-continent. Even in provinces where Muslims were in overwhelming majority, there was no League ministry before 1945.
The majority of the Indian people were with the secular program of the Indian National Congress (or with forces more radical). There was a Congress ministry in The Frontier Province. In Punjab there was a Unionist Ministry. The Unionists were a party of the Punjab landed elite but included Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus. In Sindh, the ministry led by Ghulam Hussein depended on Congress support.
Yet, when the British Colonial govt. invited representatives of the Indian people for political negotiations in 1945, the Muslim League was given as much representation as the Congress. The Congress, that represented all sections of Indian society and had support all over the country, was allowed to nominate only 5 members out of 14! The Muslim League with a fraction of the Congress’s mass base was also allocated 5 nominees, and the colonial government picked 4 of it’s own to represent Sikhs, Dalits and Muslims.
Still, out of it’s 5 members, the Congress chose to nominate only 2 Hindus, and nominated a Muslim, a Christian and a Parsi to reflect it’s secular composition. The Muslim League of course, only nominated Muslims, but it complained when the Congress nominated a Muslim – claiming that only it had the right to nominate Muslims. The Congress maintained that because it represented all communities it would also nominate a Muslim representative. India was thus represented by 7 Muslims in a group of 14, even though the Muslim population at that time was only about 25% of the country. No one could have argued that Muslims were being crowded out or dominated by Hindus in the independence discussions and negotiations. (In fact, it is more relevant to point out that the Indians picked to negotiate with the British were not true representatives of the Indian people.)
Between 1942 and 1945 when the Congress had launched the Quit India movement, all the senior Congress leaders were jailed. This gave the Muslim League a free hand to incite communal passions amongst the educated Muslims of the sub-continent. The British authorities gave overt support to the League in this period. The League told the Muslim elites in the Muslim majority states that they would be denied all rights in a Hindu dominated India and that only they – the Muslim League, could guarantee their rights as Muslims. The fear-mongering worked to the extent that in the 1945 provincial elections, the League ended up with almost half the seats in Bengal; it increased it’s seats in Punjab, winning as many as the Unionist party and more than the Congress. It also increased it’s strength in Sind (but fell short of a majority). Still, the League could not extend it’s influence in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. In the Frontier Province, the Congress was once again able to form the ministry.
But these gains were enough for the British colonial government to claim that the Muslim League deserved to be given as much importance as the Congress in discussing the terms of independence. They discounted the Congress with it’s much broader appeal – an appeal that went far beyond the narrow elites who were allowed to vote in those limited elections. It was forgotten that the Muslim League had only been able to garner some support when the Congress was at a serious disadvantage with most of it’s leaders in jail.
But this was precisely the British plan. They wanted to leave power to the most undemocratic forces in the country – forces that had been most loyal to their rule, and hence traitors to the aspirations of most people of the sub-continent. They conspired to chart India’s independence in a manner that would inhibit and constrain India’s future development. If they were going to lose their direct hold on India, they wanted to ensure that India remain vulnerable to external manipulation and be as subservient to the dictates and demands of policy-makers in the West.
Partition – Colonial Chicanery?
As late as 1946, the Muslim League was prepared to accept autonomy. But their price for unity was based on undemocratic and unacceptable demands. They had wanted reserved seats for Muslims in excess of their population – on the basis that they had been former rulers of the country. They insisted that several aspects of the future administration be run on communal lines, a divisive and again, undemocratic demand. Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League had to become the first Prime Minister even though his popular following was nowhere near comparable to any leader of the Congress.
These were the League’s real demands – but they couched the failure of their negotiation with the Congress in the rhetoric of “Muslim self-determination”. The right of self-determination is usually invoked by the historically oppressed – not those who had once been emperors and members of the ruling elite. That Muslims in India were a minority was hardly relevant since India’s unity had not been forged on the basis of religion, or by any single dominant grouping. India’s Hindus were not a homogenous group. They were divided by caste, region, culture and language. What united Hindus is also what united Muslims – the collectively shared experience of being ravaged by colonial rule and a broad cultural affinity that transcended differences of religion and language.
The choice before India was not between two nations – Hindu and Muslim. It was between several small nations (that would inevitably fall prey to neo-colonial machinations) or one large federal nation that could mediate differences in a democratic way – but create a nation unified enough to develop and progress independently of external interference.
The Congress had promised several constitutional protections for Muslims to practice their religion and Muslims to have their own legislation in matters of personal law and personal property. But the Muslim League rejected all compromises and insisted on partition as the only solution, and the British ordered a mock plebiscite to decide the issue. Without universal voting, no vote could have been seen as decisive or representative. Although the Muslim League narrowly succeeded in it’s aims by getting the educated elite of Punjab and E. Bengal – (the two largest states in original Pakistan) to vote for partition, the parties in the NWFP who were opposed to partition boycotted the plebiscite. And no plebiscite took place in the states where Muslims were not in a majority. Surely a decision as important as political vivisection should have required a nation-wide referendum with ample time for opponents to make their case? That the wishes of the millions of Muslims who lived in Hindu-majority states were not taken into account at all shows how false and weak was the Muslim League’s claim to be the sole or leading representative for India’s Muslims.
The Muslim League had connived with the British to present partition as a fait-accompli. With great regret, many accepted it as a temporary setback, but hoped that once the British left, the future would be different. But the Muslim League and the British were taking no chances. To ensure that Hindus and Muslims did not get together to reverse this precipitous course, the Muslim League (with British backing and cover) resorted to several acts of blackmail and terror. All Muslim civil servants and army officers were exhorted to leave for Pakistan. First, they were warned that they would be mistreated in India. When Maulana Azad combated the vicious rumor-mongering by the League and assured Muslims that their rights would be protected in secular India, many Muslims sought to stay on. At that point, the League threatened to harm their property interests and their relatives in Pakistan. Under the pressure of such blackmail, most caved in and migrated to Pakistan.
Few of Pakistan’s Hindus and Sikhs had wanted to leave. With strong ties to their neighbors and communities – they had never imagined that the situation would deteriorate as rapidly as it did. They had accepted partition, but hoped that they would be allowed to live in peace as they had for centuries earlier. They had assumed that generations of shared ties would enable free travel and trade between the two nations. The gruesome nature of partition destroyed all illusions. Not only did partition divide the sub-continent on an ahistoric and unpopular premise – the manner in which it took place guaranteed that the two new nations would be borne through bloody anguish and nurse long-lasting wounds.
